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Paradox, Incompleteness and




1. On the form and development of the Science of
Knowledge (WL)
1 Although there are some similarities between the main divisions of Fichte’s successive
expositions of the WL, especially after 1805, a common form or method is hardly to be
found. We could compare the common character of the different versions of the WL to
family  resemblances,  like  a  set  of  features  which  intersect,  return  and  become
recognized  again  under  different  guises,  appearing  without  a  necessary  order  or
sequence. Fichte successively employs concepts such as “absolute I”, “consciousness”,
“absolute knowing”, “intellectual intuition”, “existence”, “image” or “appearance as
appearance” to express the main principle of the WL, and such differences contribute
to the changes in the forms of exposition. 
2 The crisis in Fichte’s thought that followed the charge of atheism at the turn of the 19th
century was caused, first, by the need, imposed on Fichte primarily by external factors,
to clarify the role of the absolute in the WL, and secondly, by the pressure to produce
an  epistemological  justification  for  his  point  of  view.  Both  problems,  namely  the
question  regarding  the  role  of  the  absolute,  and  the  question  regarding  the
epistemological justification of the WL, are met in the large propaedeutic and critical
Introduction  to  the  WL  at  the  beginning  of  the  Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre
(Exposition of the WL) from 1801/1802. This Introduction is completely different from the
1st and 2nd Introductions of 1797, which take knowing (Wissen) as an object, and not as
an act of the subject. 
3 Following the charge of atheism and the criticism of the “point of view of reflection”,
which started around the same time, the problem of an epistemological justification of
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the WL began to be taken seriously by Fichte. The Introduction to the WL can no longer
consist in simply bringing the reader into an external and alien object to be known, but
it must reflect knowing in itself and construct a “knowing of knowing” (“Wissen des
Wissens”)  or  “absolute  knowing”, which  does  not  admit  a  subject  outside  it.  A
significant innovation in the Exposition of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/1802 is thus the
extensive propaedeutic and critical introduction which precedes the WL in the strict
sense. This innovation is distinctive of the lectures on the WL from 1801/1802, and is
not to be found in a similar way in any of the expositions in the following or in the
preceding years. The reason for this exception is that, according to the new concepts
and  definitions  of  the  later  WL,  the  functions  of  a  critical  and  propaedeutic
introduction  do  not  fit  into  a  previous  and  separate  place,  but  can  and  should  be
included in the body of the WL. The so-called “Wahrheitslehre” (“Doctrine of Truth”) of
the second exposition in 1804, for example, is in some of its functions comparable to
the Introduction of 1801/1802, but it  is conceptually part of the WL, and not just a
preliminary to it. The result of including propaedeutic and critique in the theory itself
is the illumination of some inner tensions of the WL, which will be essential in its late
presentations, as I will discuss later.
4 The changes in the external form of the WL, such as the addition of an Introduction and
large  divisions  of  the  text,  are  much  greater  before  1804  or  1805  than  after.
Notwithstanding  significant  internal  differences  in  the  way  of  exposition  and
argumentation, the external form is relatively stable after 1805. This stability occurs by
virtue of the assimilation into the WL of the above mentioned features, including the
self-justification of its own procedures and, also, a transcendental-critical approach to
the problem of the absolute and ultimate foundations. These are no longer treated as
matters to be solved prior the presentation of the WL itself but as the core theoretical
elements  in  it.  This  relatively  stable  external  form  comprises  too  many  points  of
departure, contents and concepts to be studied in detail here. Therefore, I will restrict
my  focus  to  some  difficult  points  which  seems  to  me  especially  important  for
interpreting Fichte’s WL in its different expositions and in its development.
 
2. On the role of oppositions in the WL
5 As  a  result  of  those  developments,  the  WL  becomes,  on  the  one  hand,  a  theory
constantly examining its  own epistemological  conditions.  At  every step it  calls  into
question how its own statements and concepts can be thought or realized. On the other
hand,  as  a  consequence  of  this,  the  WL  “oscillates”  (“wavers”:  “schwebt”)  between
idealism  and  realism,  problematic  and  categorical  –  according  to  the  well-known
expression “wenn…soll…/so…muss…” (“if it should…/then it must…”) – between intuition
and  understanding,  consciousness  and  self-consciousness,  WL  and  actual  knowing,
amongst others. The point is now to show the impossibility of thinking one term of
these oscillating pairs without the other. The general unifying term of the disjunction
is the concept Fichte calls “light” and which he defines as “pure genesis”. “Light” is
accordingly often characterized as “absolute sequence” or “absolute relation”, which
means insight into the unity of the two terms. But because Fichte also tries to show that
pure “light” cannot be thought without generating its  opposite,  the content  of  the
system is essentially unstable, and its epistemological clarification always involves a
game of mutual eclipses and mutual interference of its terms.
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6 It could be useful to distinguish this way of thinking from Hegel’s dialectics. The latter
produces synthetic concepts which preserve and subordinate the opposites, solving the
contradiction in a greater concreteness, while in the WL the opposition is not strictly
speaking resolved in a  synthetic  concept,  but suspended or extended as  an infinite
function of knowing. This extension results from the “annihilation” or negation of the
concept  and  the  production  of  the  differences  that  define  reflection,  intuition  and
image. Fichte names this absence of an immediate resolution of the oppositions and
mutual  eclipse  of  the  different  insights  the  “irrational  hiatus”,  “facticity”  or
“problematic  form” (“Problematizität”)  which affects  the results  of  the WL,  with the
exception of the demonstration of this very problematic form. This is indeed apodictic.
Since it  is  problematic,  the  WL’s  methodology is  grounded on a  “Sollen” (“should”)
which is neither necessary nor contingent, but an object of free choice. In 1804, for
example, “we appear to ourselves as a mere task, that may be fulfilled or not,  that
wavers  regarding  its  actuality  between  being  and  not-being  […].”1 In  its  full
development this thesis finally becomes the impossibility of thinking the “problematic
form”  (“Problematizitat”)  without  the  “categorical  form”  (“Kategorizität”),  and
conversely, so that one cannot decide whether the ground of the WL is categorical or
problematic.2
7 But Fichte does not interpret this situation of epistemological pessimism, which finds
the  apodictic  form  only  at  a  meta-level  of  reflection,  as  an  insufficiency  or  as  an
unsolvable epistemological problem. The WL, so to say, fills in this insufficiency with
content, insofar as it makes it the transcendental condition of consciousness. Hence,
the WL will try to show that the mutual implication of the opposites is the necessary
condition of human knowing and consciousness.
 
3. Some principles for the interpretations of Fichte’s
thought
8 The oscillation,  which is  normally  antinomic  –  the  oscillating between realism and
idealism where each term generates the other – is closely linked with the production of
differences, the understanding of which seems to me essential for interpreting Fichte’s
text.  Fichte’s  argumentative  thread  presupposes some main  theoretical  differences,
which  cannot  be  reduced  to  unity  without  cancelling  the  conditions  of  possible
experience and consciousness. Much of the argumentation in the various versions of
the WL is grounded on demonstrating the impossibility of annulling these differences,
sometimes by reductio ad absurdum.
9 Thus,  it  is  often  asked  what  would  happen  if  we  were  unable  to  distinguish  the
statement or the thought of something “in-itself” (“an sich”) and the transcendental
conditions that allow this thought, i.e., the form that the “In-itself” necessarily takes so
that it can be thematic. It is also asked what it would be to know without the difference
or distance between me and myself that seems to occur in all cases of the conscious
reflection which, apparently, “must possibly accompany all my representations.”3 But
it should also be asked, finally, what it would mean for us to be unable to distinguish an
immediate or intuitive level of consciousness from another one that is conceptual and
discursive – either by trying to account for knowing exclusively on the basis of concept
alone, or from intuition alone. It can be concluded that any such attempt is based on
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self-oblivion,  lack  of  reflection  and  half-philosophies  affected  by  various  kinds  of
blindness.
10 The WL systematically uses these three differences, which could be named, according
to the vocabulary of the WL, transcendental, reflective and critical difference. The first
one, transcendental difference, makes it possible to produce the very object of the WL.
As Fichte sometimes says, in order to acquire the object of the WL you must have the
“transcendental spirit”. Without this “spirit” the discourse will remain empty, because
“where you speak, you speak about something that, in all other cases, is known and exists
before this speaking of it: – here, you speak about something that is and becomes only by
way of speaking about it.”4 “Transcendental spirit” establishes the field of the WL, the
reflective domain of the conditions of possibility of experience as distinct from the
objects of experience. Every thematic object in the WL is defined on the basis of this
difference, and its oblivion would mean that the WL is meaningless, because it would be
empty. 
11 The origin  of  this  difference,  as  Fichte  often  stresses,  is  in  close  relation  with  the
faculty of reflection, and the use of reflection as the main tool of philosophical thought.
The second difference addressed by Fichte is, thus, the difference generated by the I,
which finds herself only on the condition of distinguishing herself from herself. The
statement “I am I” therefore presupposes identity but also non-identity. The place of
the Not-I is, thence, foreseen already in the absolute I itself – if it should be an I at all –
a question to which I will return further below. This function of the non-identical is
essential for the structure of the WL, as it becomes clear, for instance, in the Grundlage
der  gesamten  Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations  of  the  Entire  Science  of  Knowledge)  of
1794/1795,  where  the  argument  appeals  to  the  definition  of  “concept  of  the  I”  as
necessarily reflecting on itself: “the I must reflect about itself.”5 Or, to take another
example, it is essential for the 1805 argument about the absolute light’s untenability:
“absolute light {inwardly} (i.e., which for its being does not presuppose anything but its
own being), sees necessarily itself: a|a.”6 The downfall of this difference, the pure I or
pure light, which is beyond the statement of its own identity (a|a) would understand
the absolute I as a pure expansion, or pure “genesis”, that could not be objectified. Pure
genesis,  pure potentiality (faculty, “Vermögen”),  from 1807 on, must interrupt or fix
itself in order to make self-consciousness and reflection possible. Also the “image” is
the key-concept of the late WL precisely because the image is meaningless without the
recognition of the non-identity, as the absence of its object. The reflective difference is,
finally, the reason why the image can only be image “as” (“als, “qua”) such. The whole
of  the late  WL,  which begins  with the notion of  pure appearing (“Erscheinen”)  that
knows  itself  as  appearing (“ als  Erscheinung”),  is  therefore  based  on  the  reflective
difference.
12 But this second form of difference is articulated also with the third one, namely, critical
difference. This one is received directly from Kant, as the difference between intuition
and  concept.  It  is  closely  linked  to  reflection,  since  it  is  carried  out  by  the
understanding  upon  immediate  intuition.  The  reflective  difference  could  be
systematically seen as the difference between the first act of pure genesis, the pure
“springing up” (“Entspringen”)7 and its reflective apprehension, which hinges on the
conceptual  faculty,  intelligence  or  understanding.  Fichte’s  position  regarding  the
critical division and radical heterogeneity of the faculties, is to accept – contrarily to
Kant – intellectual intuition but, as it is well known, as an “intuition of an act, not of
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any object.”8 Intellectual  intuition is  a  condition at  the  transcendental  level  of  the
faculties of experience’s constitution, that confirms precisely the necessity of the split
between intuition and understanding as condition of possibility for consciousness.
13 Fichte articulates those three forms of difference in various arguments, establishing
equivalences and systematically drawing conclusions. Those interpretation principles
can be applied to formulations that expresses paradoxes, incompleteness and labyrinth
in the WL, as we shall see.
 
4. Paradoxes, circularity and ambiguity
14 Various lectures on the WL describe a movement of thought which leaves no empty
space,  and  which,  as  in  a  labyrinth,  systematically  oscillates  between  different
directions until a central point is reached, from which it returns toward the surface.
This is clearly the case of the antinomic wavering discussed in the second exposition of
1804, where the transcendental space is systematically and thoroughly fathomed until
the definition of the “Ansich” (“In-itself”) in the absolute sense, wherefrom the thought
returns again. In this oscillation between idealism and realism, the energy of thought is
the condition of possibility for representing its object. The object, in turn, conditions
its  representation,  as  object  in  itself.  Expressed in  another  image,  not  exactly  as  a
labyrinth, but as a circle, the field of transcendental philosophy is already in 1794/1795
described as an alternation where the thing in itself and the phenomenon reciprocally
posit one another. This is “that circle which it [sc. the finite spirit] is able to extend into
infinity, but can never scape.”9
15 I would like to show that these tropoi of paradoxes, circularities, or infinities are not
merely formal but settle the conceptual content and conclusions of the WL, according
to at least some of its various versions. An analysis of Fichte’s arguments and concepts,
centered in some paradoxical, labyrinthine or else ambiguous cases allows one to read
the  WL,  in  some  of  its  different  expositions,  as  a  systematic  production  of
incompleteness.
 
4.1. Untying the conceptual knot
16 The first passage in the text to which I would like to call your attention is a key passage
in  the  Foundations  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre where  Fichte  presents  a  main  discovery
which emerges in the course of the first exposition of the WL. Fichte seems to discover
that the exposition actually carried out, where the first principles are presented in an
independent  way,  is  inadequate,  and  even  appears  to  be  contradictory.  It  is  this
inadequacy and apparent contradiction that Fichte attempts to solve in the following
expositions, without essentially changing his main theses. In some way, therefore, the
Foundations of 1794/1795 work toward their own invalidation, or toward showing that
its  own exposition  is  untenable.  More  specifically,  Fichte  intends  to  show that  the
unification of I and Not-I is ultimately not possible under the presupposed conditions,
i.e., by presenting the principles as unconditioned acts of human spirit understood as
three absolutes without a reciprocal relation. 
17 As noted already by an early  interpreter,  M.  Wundt,10 the Foundations of  1794/1795
display strong tensions, where the contradiction is not resolved, and a “tragic” mode of
philosophy  is  carried  out,  which  stresses  the  inadequacy  of  the  sensible  to  the
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intelligible.  But  this  only  happens  because  the  verification  of  a  deadlock,  and  the
impossibility of proceeding further is required in order to solve the problem of the
system  of  knowing.  Fichte  speaks  thus  of  a  “knot  [that]  is  not  so  much  loosed  as
projected into infinity.”11 Untying the knot is thus presented as an infinite process.
18 Notwithstanding the greater or lesser adequacy of the external form of exposition, it
should be noted that it is this very impossibility of solving the problem that is raised
into a system. In fact, regarding the aforesaid knot, the philosopher states that “we do
not so much explain the explicandum as show rather, that, and why, it is inexplicable.”12
At several key points in the lectures on the WL, the issue is to find the deadlocks, which
are sometimes expressed as paradoxes, and to draw systematic conclusions from them.
It is the exposition of deadlocks and aporiai that causes a change in point of view, that
makes it possible to apprehend the WL, or even to enter into it, according to some of its
versions.
19 Later  in  the  Foundations of  1794/1795,  Fichte  states:  “we can see  […]  how the  very
circumstance  which  threatened  to  destroy  the  possibility  of  a  theory  of  human
cognition becomes the sole condition under which such a theory can be established.”13
This passage reveals an important feature of the WL as a reinterpretation of Kant’s
transcendentalism. This feature, which I will address now, can be found in different
concepts with distinct roles in the various versions of the WL. These concepts express
synthetic solutions for the problem of oppositions which seems to be irreducible: in the
Foundations,  the  “imagination”,  later,  the  concept  of  “image”.  Other  concepts
sometimes play a similar role,  in a somewhat negative stage,  i.e.,  they express that
“circumstance  which  threatened  to  destroy  the  possibility  of  a  theory  of  human
cognition”, namely the concepts of “irrational hiatus”, “fact” or “facticity”.
20 The  aforementioned  threatening  circumstance  is  the  incompatibility  between  the
absolute  opposing  concepts  which,  at  the  point  of  the  Foundations quoted,  are  the
“finite subjective and the infinite objective.”14 But the problem has no solution insofar
as it is posited at the level of what is “merely […] thought.”15 The answer therefore will
not be to give up the construction of a system of knowing, but to change the way of
thinking.  Thought must  be extended beyond itself,  which is  done by the faculty of
transcendental  imagination  and  intuition.  This  space  –literally  outside  thought–
produces the schematism of  empirical  reality,  insofar  as  it  allows one to  think the
opposites together, without reducing them to nothing. The sharp conceptual opposites
are  potentialized  and  posited  by  the  imagination  in  simple  spatial  and  temporal
extension.
21 Fichte’s thesis is that the impossibility of proceeding further does not prove that the
project  of  a  systematic  foundation  of  knowing  is  impossible,  but  it  shows,  on  the
contrary, the necessity of facticity, of the hiatus or, finally, of experience as conditions
of possibility for the system. Experience is the expression of the contradictory nature of
concept  in  itself,  and  it  is,  thus,  possible  to  demonstrate  a  priori  the  fact  that
experience is not a priori deductible. 
22 Imagination is  the non-conceptual production of  reality,  it  constitutes the “state of
intuition”, which links thought to “touching” (Berühren)16 and to “reality”, considering
that Fichte accepts the empiricist thesis that “there is no other reality save that derived
through  intuition.”17 This  reality  function  will  appear  again  under  the  form  of
“existence” (“Dasein”) in the later versions of the WL.
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4.2. Experience as unaccomplished knowing
23 Another  feature  of  experience  that  Fichte  stresses  in  different  contexts  is  its
unaccomplished character. It can be clearly seen also in the Exposition of 1801/1802 and
in the Wissenschaftslehre from Königsberg, where he insists on the issue of the infinity of
knowing. The resolution of the contradiction by the imagination results, as has been
said,  in  the  un-accomplishment  of  reality,  which  is  described  by  Fichte  as  the
movement of touching and of being repelled between finite and infinite, or between the
requirement  to  accomplish  the  task  of  the  system  of  human  knowing  and  the
“impossibility of carrying it out.”18
24 Fichte hence introduces the concept of “Schweben” which seems to mean not so much a
“wavering”,  as  it  is  sometimes  translated,  but  a  directed  “oscillating”,  without  a
support,  between  opposites,  which  refers  to  the  fact  that  imagination  is  self-
supporting. Fichte also mentions in the Foundations this last thesis as the building of a
“bridge” between I and Not-I19 because, if it is true that the bridge needs footholds on
both sides,  it  must also support itself  and sustain itself  in the air by its  own inner
consistency. 
25 Although the knot tied by the opposites cannot be untied, and the circle cannot be
broken, the imagination’s oscillation creates a mix or intermediate between infinite
objective and subjective finite, and the subject of the philosophical demonstration is
precisely  the  impossibility  of  closing  the  system.  Even  the  simple  thought  of  the
opposites already presupposes the activity of imagination, because without it “we could
not even have thought them, for they were nothing at all and one cannot reflect about
nothing.”20 Such incompleteness, which belongs to experience, is a direct consequence
of the incompleteness of the transcendental constitution of the system itself, according
to the principle of the reflective justification of its own proceedings. As has been said,
generally speaking, the WL deals with the apodictic demonstration of the impossibility
of a demonstration.
26 The general thesis about incompleteness or the impossibility of reaching a conclusion,
which is  present  both  at  the  object,  with  the  resulting  necessity  of  experience  for
human consciousness,  and in  the system of  transcendental  philosophy itself,  is  the
problem of the opening vs. closure of the system. 
 
4.3. Opening and ambiguity in the absolute I
27 The above mentioned contradiction in the exposition of the Foundations of 1794/1795 is
explained in a passage which expresses not so much a paradox, as an ambiguity that
lies in the absolute I  from the beginning and that makes itself  increasingly explicit
throughout the exposition. At first sight, one would say the whole exposition disallows
itself with the conclusion that “if the Not-I is to be able to posit anything at all in the I,
the condition for the possibility of  such an alien influence must be grounded beforehand,
prior to any effect from without, in the I as such, in the absolute I; the I must originally
and absolutely posit in itself the possibility of something operating upon it; without
detriment to its absolute positing of itself, it must leave itself open, as it were, to some
other positing.”21 We should especially note that the conclusion refers to the absolute I,
and not  to  the  finite  or  divisible  I  which,  contrarily  to  the  absolute  I,  is  explicitly
understood as open to determination by the Not-I. Insofar as it refers to the absolute I,
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the  proposition  is  paradoxical,  for  the  absolute  I’s  definition  was  precisely  being
unconditioned, not admitting any determination, which is now denied by having to
keep itself open to a foreign determination.
28 Some of the conclusions to be drawn from this paradoxical formula have already been
pointed out  above.  First,  concerning the development of  the WL,  it  shows that  the
exposition  of  the  Foundations of  1794/1795  is  not  suitable;  it  works  in  a  constant
revision  of  its  own  starting  point,  which  will  eventually  lead  to  totally  different
expositions. In the lectures after 1804, which explicitly “go beyond the I”, the problems
that were already present in the Foundations appear in an analyzed way, i.e. divided into
clearly distinguished concepts. The reflection is understood as establishing by itself its
difference regarding being, according to the formulae sequence used in 1805: “a”, “a|a”
and “a|axb”. It means, “a”, seeing or I, must duplicate itself reflectively, “a|a”, and this
duplication is conditioned by the opposition or distinction regarding an absolute being,
“a|axb”. The reflection of existence upon itself can only be carried out if it separates
itself from its other, absolute being. There is no reflection without opening to being.
29 Also, according to the theory of image, image is image for two reasons. First, it must
reflect in itself, and so it is autonomous, self-sufficient and posited by itself – and that
is why it is also seeing, light or absolute genesis and pure “Entspringen” (“springing
up”). Image is not an effect or a consequence of its object, but must have spontaneity
within itself. On the other hand, however, image is image because, seen from another
side, it is not self-sufficient, but depends on being, otherwise it wouldn’t distinguish
itself from pure being, and would simply be identified with it. But what distinguishes
image from being? Precisely its reflective faculty, the feature which Fichte stresses, i.e.,
being image “as image” (“als  Bild”).  If  the image didn’t  recognize itself  as image,  it
would obviously not carry out its figurative function, but would adhere completely to
the  continuity  of  being.  Every  figuration has  as  its  condition  “reflexibility”  (“
Reflexibilität”), and the resulting difference toward being. 
30 Meanwhile, as has been said, the discovery of the opening in the absolute I – which will
develop into the theory of existence and image – is, in the Foundations of 1794/1795, a
consequence of a structural ambiguity in the absolute I. This ambiguity lies in its being
simultaneously autonomous and reflective. The problem is that the absolute I, because
it  is  an  I,  is  implicitly  reflective,  and  this  condition  cannot  be  explicit  from  the
beginning. However, as reflective, it has already passed into the finite I. The absolute I
is ambiguous  because  it  must  be  a  pure  non-  or  still  pre-reflective  potentiality  to
reflection. On the one hand, it is an absolute pre-reflective positing, on the other hand
(still being an I), it implies a positing of reflection.
31 The  I,  as  Fichte  will  explicitly  find  out  later,  cannot  be  absolute  without  being
reflective. Thence, in the theory of life that Fichte works out in the WL of Königsberg,
the “absolute life” cannot be but “seeing”, and “seeing” is necessarily “seeing itself”,
because the absolute positing cannot refer but to itself. On the other hand, the absolute
I cannot be self-referent without ceasing to be absolute. The paradoxical statement of
the absolute I’s opening to some other positing and to the determination by something
alien to it is only the unavoidable consequence of the duplicity which will eventually
make the concept of the absolute I unsuitable.
32 Again,  this  ambiguity  or  paradox  could  lead  us  once  again  to  dismiss  the  WL  as
untenable, or to say that its exposition is simply wrong. As seen, on the contrary, the
ambiguity  should  be  understood  as  the  very  condition  of  human  knowing,  which
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oscillates between reflexibility and absolute autonomy. Such oscillation is – according
to the theory of transcendental imagination – the substratum of every knowing and
figuration. The object of the WL is to prove that consciousness is only possible under
this paradoxical, ambiguous condition or hiatus.
 
4.4. On the construction of absolute knowing in 1801/1802
33 The problem with the Foundations of the WL is that the aforementioned ambiguity is not
brought to light from the beginning but, on the contrary, the thesis of the absolute
position is presented in such a way that the reader is led to admit exactly the opposite,
i.e., that the absolute I is absolutely unconditioned and cannot be eclipsed, interfered
with  or  determined  by  any  other  positing.  Insofar  as  this  ambiguity  is  not  clearly
exposed,  this  insufficiency  in  the  exposition  should  be  taken  as  a  reason  for  its
evolution. The concept of absolute knowing, as present in the introduction to the WL of
1801 is still  an attempt to state from the beginning this paradoxical constitution of
human consciousness.
34 According to the introductory argument of the Exposition of 1801/1802, the difficulty of
treating absolute knowing or, more clearly, the knowing of knowing theoretically, is the
impossibility of objectifying it. We know it – thematically and reflectively – always from
the outside, as a thematic object of knowing. Any reflective definition of knowing will
leave aside the knowing that constitutes this very definition itself. This knowing at a
superior level is defined as an act that is not contained in the definition, in the “was”
(“what”),  or  as  we  could  say,  in  the  “ti  esti”  of  knowing.  This  act  is  by  definition,
ultimately  non-objectified  and  irreducible  to  any  concept  of  knowing.  Therefore,
absolute knowing cannot be built as the object of another knowing about it, but only by
assuming that it is required to presuppose in it a pre-reflective act, endowed with a
non-intellectual, non-descriptive and also non-predicative component of knowing.
35 The non-predicative component is the intuition of an act, or intellectual intuition. The
description of the successive reflection levels of the objectified knowing would go on
forever  unless  it  is  understood  that  knowing  contains  a  pragmatic  component,  of
absolute spontaneity, also of facticity or of an intuition irreducible to the concept, the
“what” (“Was”). As a free self-positing, the act that cannot be objectified is the pure
“genesis”22 of knowing. Absolute knowing, as built in the WL of 1801/1802 is mainly the
methodological consciousness of this fact.
36 This is therefore a genetic knowing and, in the author’s words, “it contains in itself its
origin.” Absolute knowing is  also defined as the “interiority of  the origin,” i.e.,  the
knowing  with  the  methodological  consciousness  that  the  principle  of  freedom,  or
absolute self-positing, is the condition for the construction of a knowing of knowing,
that is to say, of the WL. The act in question is free because it cannot be objectified – in
the sense of being determined by concepts of experience. And thus associating freedom
with that which cannot be objectified under concepts, Fichte will argue throughout the
lectures  that  every  contingency,  incompleteness,  and  non-conceptual  aspect  of
experience, (i.e., critical difference in general, with the ‘mixed’ character of experience
associated  with  it),  is  nothing  but  an  expression  of  freedom.  Among  such  non-
conceptual features studied by Fichte are the directions in space, the multiplicity of the
I in space and the sequence of time. This mixed character of experience is what Fichte
calls formal freedom determined by absolute being.
Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 12 | 2016
9
37 It is so because the genetic feature of the knowing that knows itself as originating from
a free act, or from a self-intuition that cannot be objectified, is also an oscillating ‘to-
be-between’, a “Schweben”. As Fichte states, “the central point and specific focus of the
absolute knowing is  found. It  does not lay in grasping itself  as knowing (by formal
freedom) nor in the annulation in absolute being, but simply between both; one is not
possible without the other.”23 Knowing “wavers thus between its being and not-being:
as  it  must  surely  do,  since  it  brings  in  itself,  knowing  it,  its  origin.”  24 Oscillating
between being and not-being, as Fichte argues in this text, also defines freedom, self-
consciousness and experience – i.e., the empirical world, or space and time – and that is
why the WL consists in proving the impossibility of thinking any one of these terms
without  the  other  two.  There  is  no  freedom without  self-consciousness  or  without
empirical world; there is no empirical world, time or space without freedom; there is
no self-consciousness without empirical world and freedom. This is the unbreakable
link between freedom, which is self-positing and therefore disposes of being and not-
being,  and  the  reflective  self-consciousness.  As  a  conclusion,  there  is  no  self-
consciousness without an irreducible domain of facticity, contingence and the empiric
element. 
 
4.5. Incompatibility of form and matter
38 Because of the pragmatic and non-predicative component of the argument, paradoxical
constructions  and  self-cancelling  expressions  necessarily  play  a  key  role  in  it  –
according to the oscillation pointed out in the last point. We will see now how this self-
cancelling is a main device, which functions in the content and the form of exposition.
The paradox is presented as the annulation of the form by the matter of the insight:
“the absolute ‘what’  [Was] of knowing […],  as ‘what’,  must find itself,  regardless all
freedom, […] it must be for itself. It should thus intuit itself in this absolute ‘what’. Now,
any intuition is freedom, just because it is. The form of this insight will be, therefore,
annulated  by  its  matter,  it  just  disappears  in  itself  by  itself.”25 The  form  of  the
proposition  is  annulated  by  its  stuff,  for  the  ‘what’  it  is,  defined  as  the  “being  of
knowing”, because it is a definition of it, would not admit reflection, that is, the
construction of a knowing of  knowing,  if  it  should be taken objectively – so to say
“regardless freedom”, regardless of its originating act. The form of any expression of
knowing, which is free reflection and self-intuition is, thence, annulated by its matter,
the simple being of knowing. Fichte explains that this would be “a knowing without
self-consciousness,”26 namely  without  the  methodological  consciousness  of  its  own
conditions,  a  knowing  without  self-explanation,  without  WL.  The  presupposition  is
always that the reflective self-awareness is an act that cannot be objectified or defined
in a ‘what’, in a being of knowing, in summa, that cannot be thought. The performative
component cannot be structurally translated into a semantic one. That is why the WL,
in 1807, will turn into a philosophy of life, with the idea that seeing is living and living
is seeing.
39 Reflective consciousness is an act that idealizes the ‘what’, the ‘ti esti’, i.e., the being of
knowing. Idealizing being, reflective consciousness introduces the question in general27
and introduces skepticism or the nothingness of beings as it is thought and defined.
Any “Was” (‘what’) should have a “Weil” (‘because’), which can only be given by an
ultimate grounding. Without that, being is illusory and subject to critical and skeptical
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dissolution.  If  the  content  of  knowing  is  being  as  being,  fixed  and  steady,  then
reflection is banned. The form of the insight, freedom, is thus, annulated by its matter.
40 The question returns some pages bellow,28 where Fichte remarks that “necessity” is a
link  of  knowing  in  itself,  an  “absolute  thinking”  that  doesn’t  allow  “mobility”  (“
Beweglichkeit”), i.e., the logic of questioning, named the “Weil” (“because”). The “Was” is
now the necessity, which contraposes the “mobility” belonging to intuition – that is, to
the non-conceptual, which can be or not be, or is and is not, according to the classical
definition of movement, and of time and space in the empirical world. “What is in the
intuition is there simply because it is: thus, it is no more simply what it is. That’s why
this  intuition could  not  intuit,  why it  could  not  occur  in  any knowing,  but  simply
annulated its form by its matter.”29 This means just that there cannot be any intuition
without  reflection.  The  intuition  introduces  always  the  “Weil”,  because  it  is  the
expression of freedom, of the free and reflective speech of questioning. Insofar as only
freedom  can  give  an  absolute  genesis,  and  only  freedom  can  give  the  “Weil”,  the
intuition belongs necessarily to such a mobility and genesis. Pure intuition could not
occur in any knowing, because it dispenses with the “Was” and keeps being indefinable.
Fichte understands in this way that the moving and instable form of the intuition of the
object is annulated by its matter, i.e., by the need to confer a definable shape to it, and
also to itself.  According to Fichte in 1801/1802, knowing, – sc.,  experience – is thus
freedom as determined by absolute being. 
41 Fichte is simply saying that you cannot think pure being, any more than you can think
pure  freedom,  and  that  knowing  is  just,  transcendentally  speaking,  this  very
impossibility. Those are self-cancelling expressions and are thus impossible, pointing
out the necessity of their overcoming. Such eclipses of the form of the expression by its
stuff contributes negatively, in these lectures, to a demonstration of the oscillation of
knowing.  Knowing  lies  neither  in  the  self-apprehension  in  and  as  the  pure  formal
freedom, nor in its self-annulation in absolute being, and consequent loss of itself, but
“between  both”  (“zwischen  beiden”),  in  the  “wavering”  between  them,30 the  same
solution for the paradoxes of impossibility we have encountered already in the lectures
of 1794/1795.
42 Two other expressions for this mutual eclipse of the a priori components of knowing
should be briefly remarked upon. The incompatibility of an insight’s form and matter
also  defines  the  very  predicative  form  of  expression,  insofar  as  saying “is”  is  to
introduce something, some matter, into visibility – and hence the “is” is defined also as
“light” – as well as into discursivity, that is, the “is” gives the conceptual-judicative
form. It is the very act of visibility, the “is”, which is unutterable (it belongs to what
cannot  be  said,  but  only  shown…).  It  is  not  possible  to  express  under  the  strict
propositional form the transcendental difference, i.e., the statement of the light which
allows seeing, because the propositional order occurs already inside the domain
defined by the copula. Saying it would imply bringing the copula into the predicate,
reflecting again and making the copula, which is form, content. The consequences are
very clear to Fichte. As you can read in 1805, when you say that “knowing in itself is this
or that, this latter knowing is surely also again a knowing,”31 that would not be
comprehended in the predicate, and would, so to say, be projected into an exteriority,
in two possible ways: so that the definition of knowing be accepted, either the act of the
subject  must be forgotten;  or there would be an infinite iteration.  Fichte’s  strategy
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consists  in understanding this  addition to the objectified knowing as  a  principle of
facticity, or as inalienable life.
43 This paradoxical  eclipse can also be expressed under another simpler guise.  This is
Fichte ‘s repeated invitation, at the beginning of some courses, simply to think pure
being. This yields the evident contradiction that the thought of being is outside it and,
henceforth, has no place in it, and is nothing at all. This difficulty results in the above
mentioned  concept  of  image  as  “being  outside  being.”  Actually,  this  is  a  figure
equivalent to absolute knowing, whose construction requires a position at the same
time outside knowing but still in some way belonging to it. Thinking the absolute as
Schelling  and Hegel  claimed is  an  impossible  task.  In  terms of  an  intentio  recta,  as
Schelling  proposed  and  as  Kant  had  already  shown,  thought  entangles  itself  into
insoluble contradictions. Yet, as we know, such difficulties and contradictions won’t
result in an impossibility, but rather in the necessary incompleteness of the task.
 
4.6. The form of the highest insight
44 Since I must approach the conclusion, a reference should still be made to a statement in
the  WL  of  1805,  which  expresses  in  quite  a  different  way  the  difficulties  already
exposed. In some ways, it summarizes the problem and the solution proposed by the
philosopher: “The ancient philosophers grasped thus very accurately the form of the
highest and absolute insight. The mistake was only that they wanted to realize it. […]
Such insight is contradictory in itself; for insight posits the objectivity of the terms and,
furthermore,  two  terms;  while  God’s  interior  essence  is  immanence and  unity.  […]
(Besides,  the  possibility  of  consciousness  is  grounded  on  the  impossibility  of  this
proof.)”32 Referring to the ontological proof, this passage does not appear to express
any paradox, but it is quite explicit about the condition of human consciousness that
generates  the  paradoxes.  According  to  Fichte,  only  a  consciousness  to  which  the
ontological proof would be valid would be free from paradoxes.
45 On this point, we don’t see any major differences from 1794 until 1805. The late WL
accepts,  as  you can read in the quoted passage,  the impossibility of  “realizing” the
supreme insight,  that  consists  in passing from the absolute,  as  pure essence,  to  its
existence. In fact, the principle of the whole exposition of 1805 is that “knowing is the
existence of the absolute,” but this link between the absolute and its existence cannot
be an object of proof. In the markedly theologically minded version of 1807, Fichte says
that “God only reveals itself as the one who never reveals itself. […] If he could ever
enter  entirely  as  it  is  into  the  phenomena,  they  would  be  over.  It  is  only  God’s
immediate drive, which will never be realized, to be the root of our apparent existence,
that guarantees the infinity of this apparent existence of ours.”33 “To realize” hence
means to make actual, as accomplishing, to turn into res, i.e., the referred objectifying
of the terms inside the necessity of a concept. The ontological proof, which would allow
one to think the concept of the absolute as comprehending existence, and as separated
from any experience, projects a duality that Fichte rejects.
46 The impossibility of realizing the passage from the absolute to knowing, or the non-
demonstrability that the absolute exists in knowing, insofar as existence is interrupted
by an ultimate facticity, is also stressed by Fichte saying that “as existing, the absolute
changes absolute and hopelessly its own inner essence.”34 It is not the absolute that
exists, or, if it exists, then it cannot exist as absolute – or, paradoxically, it can only exist
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as absolute. But the “as” makes all the difference, because it is the free principle of
reflection and image, that may or may not posit itself. That is why Fichte says, in his
later  lectures,  that  the  absolute’s  first  scheme  is  a  “Vermögen”  (“faculty”,
“potentiality”).35 “Vermögen” is like a point, that may or may not actualize, may or may
not extend into a line, acquire dimension necessarily and some direction freely.
47 The realization of the ontological proof is hindered by the very form of human reason,
which, under the factual conditions of consciousness, does not allow deducing intuition
and  existence  from  any  concept  of  the  understanding.  Consciousness  is  possible
because the split between understanding and sensibility – i.e., critical difference – is
conclusive. To cross this gap means to untie the knot of human consciousness. “Only
after time was accomplished would the intelligence be wholly and completely freedom;
but  then  it  would  be  nothing.”36 Freedom  depends  on  the  incompleteness  of
intelligence.  But this  is  not,  according to Fichte,  a  reason for skepticism or for the
absence of an ultimate ground for knowing. Quite on the contrary. The issue is, mainly,
to prove this very indemonstrability, and that leaves the WL in a unique situation. On
the one hand, it shows the incompleteness of its own knowledge. On the other hand, as
a consequence of that, it builds an image of itself and of its relation with its object,
claiming a mediate realization of the so-called absolute which is at the basis of human
knowing, albeit ambiguously and in oscillation. Showing that both the figurations of
consciousness and the reflective self-consciousness are not possible except on the basis
of  the  image  of  an  absolute  being,  the  WL  tries also  to  show,  indirectly,  and
presupposing the fact of consciousness, the reference to the absolute as a necessary
one. 
48 Fichte thus keeps his first statement, that “we do not so much explain the explicandum
as show rather, that, and why, it is inexplicable.”37 The paradoxical and self-cancelling
formulae  converges  into  an  interpretation  of  Fichte’s  WL  as  a  self-referring  and
formally self-containing system of incompleteness. As we try to see the object of vision
in itself, as we read in the WL of 1807, repeating the assertion in the Anweisung zum
seligen Leben, “our own eye bars the way to our eye” (“unser Auge selbst steht unserm
Auge im Wege”).38 
NOTES
1. WL-1804-I,  GA  II/7,  144“Wir  daher  erscheinen  uns,  als  blosse,  zu  vollziehende  oder  nicht
vollziehende, in Absicht ihrer Wirklichkeit zwischen Seyn u. nichtseyn schwebende Aufgabe […].”
2. Cf. WL-1804-I GA II/7, 192.
3. KrV, B 131-132. 
4. WL-1805 GA II/9, 179: “wo gesprochen, wird von Etwas gesprochen, das in allen andren Fällen
vor diesem Sprechen davon bekannt ist und da ist: – hier, von etwas, das nur durch das Sprechen
davon, und in diesem Sprechen, ist und wird.”
5. GWL, GA I/2, 409: “Das Ich muß […] über sich reflektiren” (translation adapted from P. Heath
and J. Lachs).
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6. WL-1805,  GA  II/9,  215:  “Das  absolute  {innerlich}  (d.i  zu  seinem  Seyn  durchaus  nichts
voraussetzende als seine Seyn selber) Licht, sieht, notwendig sich: a/a.”
7. WL-1801/2, GA II/6, 212.
8. Cf. ZE, GA I/4, 216-217.
9. GWL, GA I/2, 412: “derjenige Zirkel, den er [der endliche Geist] in das Unendliche erweitern,
aus welchem er aber nie herausgehen kann.”
10. Cf. WUNDT, M., Fichte-Forschungen, Stuttgart: Frommann-Kurtz, 1929, p. 63.
11. GWL, GA I/2, 311: “[…] der Knoten [wird] nicht sowohl gelöst, als in die Unendlichkeit hinaus
gesezt”.
12. GWL, GA I/2, 311: “das zuerklärende nicht sowohl erklärt, als vielmehr gezeigt wird, daß, und
warum es nicht zu erklären sey.”
13. GWL, GA I/2, 367: “Wir sehen, daß gerade derjenige Umstand, welcher die Möglichkeit einer
Theorie des menschlichen Wissens zu vernichten drohte, hier die einzige Bedingung wird, unter
der wir eine solche Theorie aufstehen können”.
14. GWL, GA I/2, 368.
15. GWL, GA I/2, 366.
16. GWL, GA I/2, 367.
17. GWL, GA I/2, 368.
18. Cf. GWL, GA I/2, 367.
19. Cf. GWL, GA I/2, 412-413.
20. GWL, GA I/2, 366-367: “wir hätten über sie nicht denken können, denn sie waren absolut
Nichts, und über Nichts kann man nicht reflektiren.”
21. GWL, GA I/2, 405“[S]oll […] das Nicht-Ich überhaupt etwas im Ich setzen können, so muß die
Bedingung der Möglichkeit  eines solchen fremden Einflusses im Ich selbst,  im absoluten Ich,  vor aller
wirklichen  fremden  Einwirkung  vorher  gegründet  seyn;  das  Ich  muß  ursprünglich  und
schlechthin  in  sich  die  Möglichkeit  setzen,  daß  etwas  auf  dasselbe  einwirke;  es  muß  sich,
unbeschadet seines absoluten Setzens durch sich selbst, für ein anderes Setzen gleichsam offen
erhalten.”
22. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 171.
23. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 182“Der eigentliche Fokus, und Mittelpunkt des absoluten Wissens ist
hiermit gefunden. Er liegt nicht im sich fassen als Wissen (vermittelst der formalen Freiheit)
auch nicht im sich vernichten an dem absoluten Seyn, sondern schlechthin zwischen beiden; u.
eines von beiden ist nicht möglich, ohne das zweite.”
24. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 182-183: “Es schwebt zwischen seinem Seyn, und seinem Nichtseyn: wie
es wohl muß, da es seinem absoluten Ursprung wissend in sich trägt.”
25. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 171: “Das absolute Was des Wissens […] als Was, unabhängig von aller
Freiheit,  [soll]  sich finden […];  für  sich seyn.  In  diesem absoluten Was müsste  es  daher  sich
anschauen.  Alle  Anschauung  aber  ist  Freiheit,  schlechthin  weil  sie  ist.  Die  Form  dieser
Anschauung wird sonach durch ihre Materie vernichtet, sie verschwindet schlechthin durch sich
selbst in sich selbst.”
26. Ibid.: “ein Wissen, ohne Selbstbewußtseyn.”
27. About the transcendental function of the “question”, see WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 174 and GWL,
GA I/2, 403.
28. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 182.
29. “Aber  in  der  Anschauung ist,  was  in  ihr  ist,  schlechthin  weil  es  ist:  mithin  nicht  mehr,
schlechthin was es ist. Daher könnte diese Anschauung sich nicht anschauen, in keinem Wissen
vorkommen, sondern sie vernichtete ihre Form schlechthin durch ihre Materie.” (GA II/6, 182)
30. WL-1804-II, GA II/8, 182-183.
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31. WL-1805, GA II/9, 182: “Der Satz: das Wissen an sich ist das, ist ohne Zweifel selbst wieder ein
Wissen.”
32. WL-1805,  GA  II/9,  291:  “Die  alten  Metaphysiker  haben  daher  sehr  richtig  die  Form  der
höchsten,  u.  absoluten Einsicht  gefaßt.  Nur  sie  realisieren wollen,  war  ein  misgriff.  […]  Eine
solche Einsicht ist in ihr selbst widersprechend; denn Einsicht sezt Objektivität der Glieder, noch
dazu  zweier;  Gottes  inneres  Wesen  aber  ist  Immanenz  u,  Einheit.  […]  (Ferner,  auf  der
Unmöglichkeit dieses Beweises beruht die Möglichkeit des Bewußtseyns.”
33. WL-1807, GA II/10, 171-172: “Er [sc. Gott] offenbart sich nur, als der nie zu offenbarende. […]
Könnte er jemals ganz, so wie er ist, eintreten in die Erscheinungen so wäre diese zu Ende. Nur
daß sein unmittelbar niemals zu realisierender Trieb die Wurzel unsers scheinbaren Daseyns ist,
bürgt uns für die Unendlichkeit dieses unser scheinbares Daseyn.”
34. WL-1805, GA II/9, 257“das absolute verändert duch das Existiren sein eignes inneres Wesen
absolute, unwiederbringlich.” 
35. Cf. WL-1807, GA II/10, 193.
36. WL-1801/02, GA II/6, 321: “Nur nach vollendeter Zeit wäre die Intelligenz ganz u. durchaus
Freiheit; dann aber wäre sie nichts.”
37. GWL, GA I/2, 311.
38. WL-1807, GA II/10, 112.
ABSTRACTS
This paper studies cases of paradox and circular formulations from the Grundlage der gesamten
Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/1795 until the Wissenschaftslehre of 1805. Such formulae are required to
produce some of the main concepts of Fichte’s thought, and allow us to draw both systematic and
historical-conceptual  conclusions  about  it.  After  a  general  presentation  of  the  form  and
development of the WL, some examples of paradoxical or circular formulae are studied: As a
conclusion it  is  shown why in the WL “we do not so much explain the explicandum as show,
rather,  that,  and why, it  is  inexplicable.” The paradox and circular formulae converge on an
interpretation of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge as a self-referent and self-contained system of
incompleteness.
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